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Abstract 
Considering the fact that direct tax collection and tax to GDP ratio in Pakistan is very low 
and the budget dificit is covered using debts, which further increases the dificit in the next years. It 
was needed to study the tax administration system of Pakistan and its impact of compliance 
behavior. This study is focused on determination of the impact of tax administration system and 
quality of public governance on individual taxpayers’ compliance behavior, in the presence of 
religiosity as a moderating variable. Survey method was employed and 625 questionnaires were 
distributed using a self-administered questionnaire from the individuals across the five major cities 
of Pakistan. The response rate was 66% and 412 appropriate questionnaires were returned from the 
respondents. Results of this study showed that tax administration system and quality of public 
governance has a strong and direct impact on taxpayers’ compliance behavior whereas, religiosity 
has an inverse and weak impact on taxpayers’ compliance behavior. Furthermore, religiosity 
moderates the relationships of tax administration system from positive to negative and weaken the 
relationship between public governance and tax compliance behavior.  
Keywords: Income Tax, Tax Compliance Behavior, Tax Administration System, Public 
Governance, Religiosity  
 
Introduction 
This study is about the determination of reasons of noncompliance behavior of taxpayers, as 
it is a serious issue in Pakistan. Further, any legislation without proper consultation with taxpayers 
may also be a worthless exercise, as in the past many changes in the tax department and legislation 
related to fiscal policy have not brought considerable improvement. Coherent with most researches, 
the data is collected through survey method. A number of studies have been conducted in the past 
using archival empirical, survey, field experiment and closed laboratory methods to investigate the 
attitude of compliant and noncompliant behavior (Durham, Manly, & Ritsema, 2014), but mostly, 
survey method was employed by the researchers to build theories and tax models (Razak & Adafula, 
2013; Armstrong, Blouin, Jagolinzer, & Larcker, 2015; Alabede, 2012; Chan, Troutman, & Bryan, 
2000; Fischer, Wartick, & Mark, 1993). 
Tax revenue is the biggest source of funds for a government that is needed for development, 
public service, relieve poverty, and to establish social and physical infrastructure leading towards 
long-term growth (Lustig, Pessino, & Scott, 2014). However, developing countries including 
Pakistan have been facing a challenge in generating revenues from domestic growth (Khan & 
Ahmad, 2014). The challenges faced by Pakistan include informal sectors, small tax base, weak 
governance, low administrative capacity, ineffective per capita income and most importantly tax 
avoidance by the business class (Ahmed, Talpur, & Liaquat, 2015). According to a research by 
Amin, Nadeem, Parveen, Kamran, and Anwar (2014), 50% of the tax revenue remained uncollected 
by the Government of Pakistan due to high corruption. In Pakistan, most of the persons having 
taxable income not only evade tax but also do not register with the tax department (Kirchler, Lorenz, 
Torgler, & Ganlge, 2015). 
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Every person whose income is above a certain level or who owns assets of specific nature, is 
required to file income tax return. In Pakistan, section 120 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 provides 
a list of those persons who are required to file income tax return. The list includes a person holding 
National Tax Number (NTN), having taxable income, in possession of a 1000 CC car or above, 
having immovable property of 250 square yards in an urban area or 500 square yards in a rural area, 
have a flat in an urban area or a flat of 2000 square feet in a rural area, or who is a partner in a 
partnership firm, a company or a non-profit organization. In this regard, FBR has issued 3,388,188 
NTN certificates, which means at least these persons should file income tax returns. However, there 
are only 1,010,402 persons who filed income tax returns for the tax year 2015, which is slightly 
higher than the previous years. Despite the fact that in Pakistan, Tax Reforms Commission, under 
the supervision of FBR, has suggested a number of tax reforms over the years to increase tax 
compliance rate but statistics show that contribution of direct taxes in the total gross revenue is still 
low. FBR has also established Broadening Tax Base (BTB) department to netting the potential 
taxpayers and make such investigations as required by FBR (FBR, 2016). Although FBR is trying to 
increase its tax base, however, still there is a deficit. The Government of Pakistan is decreasing this 
deficit by decreasing its expenditures and reliance on external loans. Although, deficit has been 
decreased but not minimized (Ministry of Finance, 2017).  
 
Table 1 Analysis of Ten Years of Federal Budget of Pakistan 
Year Resources Expenditure 
Rupees (millions) 
(Deficit)/Surplus 
2010 2,107,149 2,559,367 (452,218) 
2011 2,170,537 3,109,732 (939,195) 
2012 1,902,815 3,478,353 (1,575,538) 
2013 3,681,022 4,057,292 (376,270) 
2014 3,832,739 4,235,111 (402,372) 
2015 4,279,705 4,478,535 (198,830) 
2016 4,099,828 4,841,197 (741,369) 
2017 4,713,686 5,103,780 (390,094) 
(Source: Author’s Compilation) 
 
 
Figure 1. Budgeted Deficit and Surplus (Source: Author’s Compilation) 
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The data in Table 1 shows that Pakistan is continuously facing a budgeted deficit and is 
forced to take local or foreign debts, which again put the burden on its economy. There is a need 
increase the tax base to minimize budgeted deficit. There are several studies that were conducted 
around the globe testing their hypotheses with respect to indirect and direct impact of social norms, 
personal norms and subjective norms that have influence on  taxpayers’ behavior along with testing 
the attitudinal variables related to tax payer behavior (Chan, Troutman, & Bryan, 2000; Cummings, 
Vazquez, McKee, & Torgler, 2009; Razak & Adafula, 2013; Hallsworth, 2014; Umar, Derashid, & 
Ibrahim, 2016). Similar studies were not conducted in Pakistan due to various economic, political 
and social constraints. 
Therefore, this research focuses on exploring various factors that affect taxpayers’ behavior. 
Furthermore, the impact of tax administration and public governance on tax compliance behavior is 
also checked and significant variables are highlighted. To find out the facts regarding reasons behind 
the behavior of noncompliance, quantitative data is collected using survey method.  
The gap found in the research done so far has led towards establishing the following research 
questions: 
1. What is the influence of ineffective tax administration system on taxpayers’ 
compliance behavior? 
2. Whether the quality of public governance can incline taxpayers towards tax 
compliance? 
3. How religiosity moderates the relationship of taxpayers’ behavior on tax 
administration system and public governance? 
 In the light of all these questions stated above the specific objectives of the research 
are given below: 
1. To find the effect of tax administration system on taxpayers’ compliance behavior 
2. To find the impact of public governance on taxpayers’ compliance behavior 
3. To find the moderating effect of religious thoughts on the causal relationship between 
taxpayers’ behavior and tax administrative system, and public governance 
 From the literature reviewed and the underpinning theories used in this research the 
following hypotheses are developed: 
H1: Effective tax administration system significantly influences taxpayers’ compliance 
behavior 
H2: Taxpayers’ perception of good governance has a direct relationship with their tax 
compliance behavior  
 Moderation effect of the religiosity, the moderator variable is checked alone, on the 
dependent variable by the independent variables.  
H3: The people from different sects of religion show different tax compliance behavior.  
 
Literature Review 
Compliance behavior of individuals is influenced by a number of economic, social, and 
psychological factors. Common factors include tax rates, penalties, taxation knowledge, financial 
conditions, risk preferences, taxpayers’ morale, tax evasion attitude, public governance, perceived 
tax services, and religiosity (Ali & Ahmad, 2014; Alm, 2012; Alabede, Ariffin, & Idris, 2011). 
Electronic resources show a number of other factors responsible for taxpayers' compliance behavior. 
However, tax administration and quality of public governance were focused by most of the 
researchers. Inconsistency of findings have been observed in different studies, that is why, 
religiosity as a moderator is added in this research (Lau, Choe, & Tan, 2013). The moderating effect 
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of religiosity on tax administration system and quality of public governance was not assessed before. 
Palil, Akir, and Ahmad, (2013) mentioned that only two studies have yet tested the impact of 
religiosity on taxpayers' compliance behavior and there was a need to test this variable in secular 
and religious countries. Some researchers and authors believe that concealment of government taxes 
is not immoral to the society rather payment of zakat, which is mandatory under the Islamic law 
suffices (McGee, 1998). So, the impact of religiosity is very important and hence it cannot be 
ignored.  
The lack of homogeneity in the findings regarding taxpayers' compliance behavior, 
suggested that researchers added some other factors outside the model. Five studies showed that 
penalties and fines have a negative relationship with taxpayers' compliance behavior. Similarly, 
some other studies showed a positive relationship between tax audit and taxpayers' compliance 
behavior and a study also showed their negative relationship (Marandu, Mbekomize, & Ifezue, 
2015). 
Tax Administration System and Compliance Behavior of Taxpayers 
Tax system structure includes the probability of detection, penalty, tax rates and complexity 
of tax system (Fischer, Wartick, & Mark, 1993). These factors were added in Fischer’s model. The 
increasing penalties and probability of detection can increase the compliance rate (Allingham & 
Sandmo, 1972). It was found that the involvement of government audits and low tax rates reduce the 
noncompliance (Graetz & Wilde, 1985). It was also observed that penalties and sanctions are 
necessary for the betterment of tax compliance and it is important to study some social factors 
(Jackson & Millron, 1986).  Penalties should be high where the probability of detection is low and in 
case of low penalties, the detection probability is high (Devos, 2014). Vague information about low 
detection probability and sanctions decreases tax compliance behavior (Srinivasan, 1973). The 
randomness of tax audit and fear of tax assessment can increase tax compliance behavior (Devos, 
2014). By increasing penalties and sanctions can only be increased to some extent, so there was a 
need to reconsider this fact that, only by deterrence tax compliance cannot be increased (Devos, 
2014).  Whereas, some studies found that deterrence had a negative or negligible impact on 
taxpayers’ compliance behavior (Frey & Feld, 2002; Vazquez & Rider, 2005).  Tax compliance and 
tax evasion are strongly associated to tax structure of a country (Alm, Bahl, & Murray, 1990; 
Annan, Bekoe, & Amponsah, 2014).  Three important roles are played by a good tax system: 
development of a country, equal distribution of wealth, and revenue (Marandu, Mbekomize, & 
Ifezue, 2015). In a study in Nigeria it was found that the main cause of tax evasion Nigeria was 
complex tax administration system (Muhrtal & Ogundeji, 2013). Main factors of tax evasion in 
India were high and complex tax rates, complex tax system structure, corruption, ineffective 
behavior of tax personnel, and unproductive law enforcement (Chandrappa, 2016). In Yemen the 
most critical factors responsible for noncompliance with tax laws were ineffective taxation system 
and high tax rates along with other factors (Helhel, 2014). The most serious problem of 
noncompliance of tax and lower tax base in developing countries like Pakistan is complex tax 
system, which obliges tax professionals towards not complying with tax laws by saving their time 
and money in the form of consultancy fee and facing the tax department. Taxpayers think that if 
they would file tax return the chances of being caught by the tax officials will be high (Awan & 
Hannan, 2014). Lack of supervision by the tax department over the people increases noncompliance 
and by increasing the supervision a country can improve tax compliance (Gangl, Torgler, Kirchler, 
& Hofmann, 2014). Only deterrence was not the reason to increase tax compliance but tax 
policymakers should consider both issues relating to deterrence and non-deterrence. However, 
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researchers showed that deterrence has a more significant impact than non-deterrence but a win-win 
situation should be maintained between the taxpayers and government (Hallsworth, 2014). 
Researchers relating to tax structure found that tax compliance may be increased by 
introducing favorable tax rates, timely supervision by the tax department, simplifying the tax laws, 
increasing the audit, implementation of tax penalties and the announcement of tax policies 
publically. Public confidence is necessary to introduce new amendments. Simple tax structure may 
increase the tax base in a country.   
Public Governance and Compliance Behavior of Taxpayers 
Good governance means, “the negotiation by all the stakeholders in an issue (or area) of 
improved public policy outcomes and agreed governance principles, which are both implemented 
and regularly evaluated by all stakeholders” (Bovaird & Löffler, 2003). Public governance is the 
management, supply, and delivery of political goods to the citizens of a country (Rotberg & 
Gisselguist, 2009). Taxpayers’ behavior was influenced by ethical perception and ethical perception 
was affected by the public governance. In Nigeria, the level of public goods and services was low 
resulting in noncompliance by the taxpayers. Public governance can be achieved by good taxation 
system in a country. Nevertheless, governance issues may have a positive or negative impact on the 
taxpayers’ compliance behavior (Kiow, Salleh, & Kassim, 2017). Due to the governance issue, tax 
compliance behavior of the taxpayers in Nigeria was low (Umar, Derashid, & Ibrahim, 2016). Lack 
of governance over financial resources also affected the taxpayers’ compliance behavior. Low 
public governance resulted in low taxpayers’ morale and low taxpayers’ compliance (Muhrtal & 
Ogundeji, 2013). Governance is a non-economic factor and results showed that it is negative and 
insignificant (Ching, 2013). Quality of public governance has a direct impact on taxpayers’ 
compliance behavior (Ovute & Eyisi, 2014; Cummings, Vazquez, McKee, & Torgler, 2009). It is 
also found that public governance has a significant positive impact on the taxpayers’ compliance 
behavior but no moderating impact of the financial condition and risk preferences (Alabede, Ariffin, 
Zaimah, & Idris, 2011).  
Religiosity and Taxpayers' Compliance Behavior  
The definition of religiosity by McDaniel and Burnett (1990) is, “a belief in God 
accompanied by a commitment to follow principles believed to be set by God”. It is found that 
religiosity has a weak relationship with taxpayers' compliance behavior, however, it has moderated 
the relationship of the independent and dependent variable. This variable is least tested before as put 
by some researchers (Palil, Akir, & Ahmad, 2013). Religiosity plays an important role due to the 
cultural and other factors, a strong belief in religion can change the taxpayers’ attitude (Palil, Akir, 
& Ahmad, 2013). It was found that religiosity has a significant and direct impact on volunteer tax 
compliance scheme and a weak relationship with enforced tax compliance scheme in Malaysia (Ali, 
2013). Other researchers also found that relationship between tax evasion and ethics has been 
moderated by religiosity (Lau, Choe, & Tan, 2013). 
Due to the inconsistency of the research results, the actual level of compliance cannot be 
explained by the theories of tax compliance and there is a need to test the moderation effect of its 
determinants on tax compliance (Alabede, Ariffin, Zaimah, & Idris, 2011; Dubin, Graetz, & Wilde, 
1987). Different studies suggested that tax determinants should be tested by the moderation impact 
if any prevailed (Kirchler, 2007; Baron & Kenny, 1986). Religiosity has moderates the relationship 
between demographic variables and tax compliance (Lau, Choe, & Tan, 2013). Religiosity 
positively moderates the relationship of tax knowledge, tax compliance and tax compliance behavior 
(Palil, Akir, & Ahmad, 2013).   
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A number of stakeholders are interested in tax compliance behavior of people of the country. 
The list of stakeholders includes government, economists, accountants, psychologists, and 
sociologists, as they are somehow concerned about the noncompliance behavior of people.  As one 
theory cannot cater to the noncompliance behavior of people, so there is a need to include different 
theories from economics, sociology, psychology, and anthropology to understand this issue (Alm, 
2012; Jackson & Millron, 1986).  
This study has thereupon used Deterrence Theory and Social Exchange Theory to investigate 
the tax compliance behavior. The tax compliance model derived from deterrence Theory was 
established by Becker (1968) and is based on the economics of crime approach (Erlend, Slemrod, & 
Thoresen, 2015). The theory analyzes the deterrent effects of threats and sanctions of punishments 
on unwanted illegal behavior. The theory states that an individual is a rational being attempting to 
increase utility, this is not a desire to do crime rather the difference between the benefit and cost 
leads it towards this criminal behavior. Many studies have incorporated Deterrence Theory in their 
research relating to taxpayers’ compliance behavior and concluded that taxpayers calculate the 
related benefit attached with tax evasion and compare it with the expected cost to be incurred. As in 
some countries their governments increased penalties and audits, the tax compliance rate also 
increased (Hamm, 1995; Erlend, Slemrod, & Thoresen, 2015; Jackson & Millron, 1986). The first 
researchers who used Deterrence Theory in his model were Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and they 
developed A-S Model describing that individuals evaded tax due to a rational decision between risk 
and uncertainty. Taxation administration system was very much derived from Deterrence Theory.  
Social Exchange Theory states that the change and stability are based upon the process of 
negotiation exchange between individuals and human relationships in a social framework formed, 
which is further based upon subjective cost-effective monitoring and comparisons of cost and 
reward alternatives related to relationships (Damayanti, Sutrisno, Subekti, & Baridwan, 2015). 
People consistently repeat the actions that reward them and their actions are thus based on value. 
The theory with respect to the tax compliance states that relationship between taxpayers and 
government and subsequent relationships formed on the exchange value basis where individual 
taxpayers have the expectation that government will respond by giving benefits in public service, 
rule of law, accountability, participatory democracy, quality governance and corruption control 
(Damayanti, Sutrisno, Subekti, & Baridwan, 2015). 
The Social Exchange Theory somewhat traces its own routes into the most basic concept of 
trade which is a Barter System. Interestingly, these theories put the modern human into the same 
place where he was thousands of years back, by stating that every individual forms and breaks most 
social relationships on the basis of the analysis, which involves cost paid and/or benefits received.  
 
Framework and Analysis 
The data were collected through self-administered questionnaires, which were adapted from 
Alabede (2011).  As it is commonly emphasized that sample size should be adequate to get 
generalize the results (Hair, Sarstedt, Hopkins, & Kuppelwieser, 2014; Alabede, 2012), thus an 
adequate sample is taken. 625 questionnaires were distributed to make a high response in data 
collection process (Sekaran & Bougie, 2010). According to PennState (2016), the suitable sample 
should be 398 at 95% confidence level with 50% variability for a population above 10 million. The 
sample size should be increased, at least 50%, to avoid non-response bias (Salkind, 1997).  The 
sample size was increased by 57% to avoid non-response issue and 625 questionnaires were 
distributed instead of 398. We received 447 filled questionnaires, out of which 412 were used and 
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35 questionnaires were rejected due to wrong filling, missing of some important information, and 
some minor missing figures (Aminu & Shariff, 2015).  
The sampling frame included all employees of all listed companies of Pakistan Stock 
Exchange, employees of Federal and Provincial Governments, and self-employed individuals 
located in five trade markets of big cities of Pakistan. This study has tried to remove the limitations 
of other studies by collecting data from non-filers, self-employed and individuals not bearing NTN.  
For the generalization of results, high rate of response was required as put by researchers (Hussey & 
Hussey, 1997). At first stage private and government organizations were randomly selected, ten 
questionnaires were distributed to the employees of each organization who were at the payroll of the 
organization. The demographic information of the respondents is given in Table 2. Table 3 shows 
the distribution of questionnaires in big cities of Pakistan.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Schematic Diagram 
 
Figure 2 shows the model of research where tax administration system and public 
governance has been taken as independent variables and religiosity as moderator. 
 
Table 2 Demographic Information of Taxpayers 
Category Frequency Percentage 
Qualification   
No formal education  27 6.55% 
Under matric  10 2.43% 
University Graduate 63 15.29% 
University Master  124 30.10% 
Professionals 188 45.63% 
Gender   
Male 321 77.91% 
Female 91 22.09% 
NTN Holders   
Having NTN 335 81.31% 
No NTN 77 18.69% 
Filer / Non-Filer   
Filer 219 53.16% 
Non-Filer 193 46.84% 
Tax 
Administration 
System  
Public 
Governance
Taxpayers' 
compliance 
behavior  
Religiosity  
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Filer Hired Consultants  
Yes 208 95% 
No 11 5% 
Age   
20-30 88 21.36% 
31-40 208 50.49% 
41-50 104 25.24% 
51-60 12 2.91% 
(Source: Author’s Compilation) 
 
Table 3. Geographical Distribution of Respondent 
Response Rate of the       
No. of distributed 125 125 125 125 125 625 
Returned 98 111 94 77 67 447 
Returned and usable 95 102 87 71 57 412 
Returned and excluded 3 9 7 6 10 35 
Questionnaires not 27 14 31 48 58 178 
Response rate % 78.4% 88.8% 75.2% 61.6% 53.6% 71.52% 
Usable response rate % 76% 81.6% 69.6% 56.8% 45.6% 65.92% 
(Source: Author’s Compilation) 
 
Results and Discussion 
Before collection of data and actually using it for running the statistical tests, reliability and 
validity of the instrument were checked and research findings were reported. Mahalanobis D2 test 
was run to check and deal with the outliers in the data. According to Mahalanobis D2, the value 
equal to or above 112.31 shows multivariate outliers and should be eliminated from the data (Aminu 
& Shariff, 2015). No value was above the threshold.  
As the results were drawn from Smart PLS 3.2.7 through bootstrapping, it does not assume 
that data is normally distributed because it based on nonparametric procedures (Efron & Tibshirani, 
1993). Although PLS-SEM does not require normality of the data, like multiple regression models, 
still it is important to make sure that data is not much away from the normality (Hair, Black, Babin, 
& Anderson, 2010).  VIF was checked for the possibility of multicollinearity in the data. VIF values 
are shown in Table 4. All values are below five, which shows that there is no multicollinearity.   
 
Table 4VIF Values for Multicollinearity 
Variables CB 
TAS 1.484 
PG 1.484 
RLG 1.003 
TAS X RLG 1.649 
PG X RLG 1.650 
CB= Compliance Behavior, TAS = Tax Administration System,   RLG = Religiosity 
 
PLS-SEM requires that before the assessment of inner model (structural model), the outer 
model must be assessed for its validity (Aminu & Shariff, 2015). Measurement of components was 
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dealt in the outer model, which suggests how well the items (indicators) are associated and load with 
each respective constructs. For evaluating the outer model validity and reliability are the main 
criteria in PLS-SEM analysis (Hair, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2013).  The relationship between the 
constructs relies on the reliability and validity of the measurement of their components (Hair, 
Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2013). The outer model is assessed by computing individual item reliability, 
convergent reliability and discriminant validity (Aminu & Shariff, 2015). Individual reliability 
means indicator reliability and internal consistency reliability and these can be measured by 
composite reliability (Aminu & Shariff, 2015).  
Convergent validity can be checked by evaluating the Average Variance Extracted (AVE). 
Fornell-Larcker criterion was used to check the discriminant validity (Wong, 2013; Hair, Ringle, & 
Sarstedt, 2013). Consistencies of results among same set items are usually used to measure the 
internal consistency (Hair, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2013). Composite reliability does not presume 
loading indicator of the construct, unlike Cronbach’s Alpha, the benchmark value must be more than 
0.60 (Hair, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2013; Wong, 2013).  The value of Cronbach’s Alpha more than 0.70 
is most appropriate (Hair, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2013).  The value of CR above 0.60 shows the 
average internal consistency of elements, but the value more than 0.70 up to 0.90 is most desirable 
(Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). After examining the results of Cronbach’s alpha and CR for all 
constructs it is depicted in Table-5 that all scores of Cronbach’s Alpha and CR were above the 
benchmark values  (Hair, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2013; Henseler, Ringle, & Sinkovics, 2009). The score 
of CR in this research ranges between 0.848 to 0.938, which shows the trustworthiness of underlined 
measurement models. 
The next step was the evaluation of the convergent validity, which means how items of the 
same constructs are theoretically related to each other (Henseler, Ringle, & Sinkovics, 2009).  It 
showed the degree of association between a measure of the same constructs (Hair, Ringle, & 
Sarstedt, 2013).  For measuring and identifying the convergence of elements, AVE benchmark value 
should be 0.50 and above (Hair, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2013; Henseler, Ringle, & Sinkovics, 2009) 
AVE score of 0.50 shows sufficient convergent validity means good relationship, the latent 
constructs shows indicator’s half of the variance and depicts the sufficient convergent validity (Hair, 
Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2013).   
 
Table 5 Loading, Reliability and Convergent Validity Values 
Variables Items Loading Cronbach’s CR AVE Discriminant 
Compliance 
Behavior 
CB1 0.839  
0.885 
 
0.921 0.744 YES 
CB2 0.867 
CB3 0.869 
CB4 0.875 
Tax 
Administration 
System  
TAS10 0.969  
0.773 
 
0.848 0.643 YES 
TAS11 0.949 
TAS15 0.855 
TAS18 0.052 
Public 
Governance 
PG31 0.859 0.912 0.938 0.790 YES 
PG32 0.891 
PG33 0.897 
PG34 0.907 
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Fornell-Larcker criterion is the most conventional approach for checking the discriminant 
validity and cross loading is more liberal and convenient method for the measurement of 
discriminant validity (Hair, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2013). The discriminant validity was evaluated by 
matching the value of correlations presented in Table 6. The said table depicted the score of Fornell-
Larcker criterion test with the score of AVE square root for constructs.  
 
Table 6. Discriminant Validity 
 CB PG TAS
CB 0.863
PG 0.769 0.889
TAS 0.812 0.569 0.802
CB= Compliance Behavior, TAS = Tax Administration System, RLG = Religiosity 
 
Table 7. R-Square and Adjusted R-Square 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
R-Square 0.798 0.799 0.803
Adjusted R - Square 0.797 0.797 0.801
 
The results of model 1 (figure 3 and 4) indicate the value of R-square 0.798, while the model 
2 (figure 5 and 6) indicates the results of R-Square 0.799 by adding one more variable i.e. 
religiosity, the value of R-square has shown a bit but not a significant increase. Model 3 (figure 7 
and 8) shown the moderating impact of religiosity on the independent variables TAS & PG and 
dependent variable taxpayers' compliance behavior and R-square has been increased from 0.798 to 
0.803. After this step, but before the analysis of inner model (measurement model), the contribution 
of the indicators was assessed through outer factor loading. Factor loading means the interaction of 
the identified factors with the variables (Armor, 1973). Outer loading benchmark value should be 
0.50 or above but value greater than 0.40 and less than 0.70 should be considered carefully and the 
critical items should be deleted if after the deletion of items, the CR and AVE value of remaining 
items increase (Hair, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2013).  Eight items were deleted but no construct was 
eliminated as the minimum number of indicators were present (Hair, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2013). 
Table 5 showed that all the loading values are above the recommended threshold of 0.50 which, 
indicated that the indicators have contributed much in explaining the constructs. There was no 
discriminant validity problem existed, as the value of the indicators of outer loading was higher than 
all its cross-loadings (Aminu & Shariff, 2015). After getting satisfaction from the reliability and 
validity of the outer model, the inner model was evaluated.   
 
Table 8. Direct Relationship of Independent Variables 
Variables Original Sample Standard T Statistics P Values 
TAS -> CB 0.553 0.553 0.030 18.732 0.000* 
PG -> CB 0.454 0.454 0.029 15.734 0.000* 
CB= Compliance Behavior, TAS = Tax Administration System, RLG= Religiosity (* P<.01)   
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Figure 3. PLS Algorithm Direct Relationship 
 
Figure 4. PLS-SEM Bootstrapping Direct Relationship 
 
Path coefficients of independent and dependent variables are shown in figure 3, which were 
derived from Smart PLS 3.2.7 software. Figure 4 has shown PLS-SEM bootstrapping direct 
relationships results. The results of direct relationships showed that both exogenous variables, Tax 
Administrations (TAS) and Good Governance (GG) have a positive and significant impact on 
dependent variable at P-value <0.05 and t-value above 1.96. With respect to Hଵ, results suggest that 
prevailing tax administration system has a significant and positive impact on the taxpayers’ behavior 
towards compliance (β 0.553; t=18.732; p<0.000); Many studies showed positive and significant 
relationship of tax administration system with taxpayers’ compliance behavior (Helhel, 2014; 
Chandrappa, 2016; Alstadsæter & Jacob, 2013)  whereas, penalties and threating are insignificant to 
taxpayers’ compliance behavior (Mohdalia, Isa, & Yusoff, 2014). With respect to Hଶ, results, data 
revealed that public governance has also a very strong and positive impact on the taxpayers’ 
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compliance behavior towards compliance (β 0.454; t=15.734; p<0.000); therefore, Hଶ was 
supported. By increasing the level governance position and transparent political policies, the tax 
compliance may be increased. Many studies showed that governance has a significant relationship 
with taxpayers’ compliance behavior (Umar, Derashid, & Ibrahim, 2016; Cummings, Vazquez, 
McKee, & Torgler, 2009; Alabede, Ariffin, & Idris, 2011).  
Before assessing the moderation effect on the dependent and independent variables, first of 
all the direct impact, of the independent variable and moderator, was assessed on the dependent 
variable, and then moderator was added (Garcia, Kenny, & Ledermann, 2015; Bennett, 2000).   
 
Table 9. Direct Relationship of all Independent Variables and Moderators  
Variables Original Sample Mean Standard T Statistics P Values 
TAS -> CB 0.554 0.555 0.029 18.930 0.000* 
PG -> CB 0.454 0.453 0.029 15.633 0.000* 
RLG -> CB -0.015 -0.015 0.025 0.622 0.534 
CB= Compliance Behavior, TAS = Tax Administration System RLG Religiosity (*P<.01)   
 
TAS was remained supported with an increase in the t-value from 18.732 to 18.930 and β–
value changed from 0.553 to 0.554 with no change in p-value. PG was also shown a strong and 
positive relationship with CB where t-value decreased from 15.734 to 15.633 with no change in β–
value and p-value. The religiosity showed a negative and weak relationship with compliance 
behavior (β -0.015; t=0.622; p>0.534). In Paris, religiosity has a weak relationship with tax frauds or 
tax compliance (Welch, et al., 2005). The new independent variable showed an insignificant 
relationship with taxpayers’ compliance behavior which means that in Pakistan the religiosity has an 
insignificant impact on taxpayers' compliance behavior.    
 
Figure 5. PLS Algorithm Direct Relationship 
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Figure 6. PLS-SEM Bootstrapping Direct Relationship 
 
Table 10.Moderating Impact of Religiosity  
Variables Original Sample Standard T Statistics P Values 
TAS -> CB 0.551 0.552 0.029 19.227 0.000** 
PG -> CB 0.458 0.458 0.029 15.933 0.000** 
RLG -> CB -0.013 -0.012 0.023 0.534 0.594 
TAS X RLG -> CB -0.084 -0.083 0.033 2.516 0.012* 
PG X RLG -> CB 0.061 0.061 0.033 1.819 0.069 
CB= Compliance Behavior, TAS = Tax Administration System, RLG Religiosity (* P≤.05 ** 
P<.01)   
 
Data in table 10 showed religiosity strong moderating impact on public governance and tax 
administration system. In the presence of religiosity, the relationship of PG has been weakening and 
became insignificant (β 0.061; t=1.819; p>0.069). Whereas religiosity did not disturb the significant 
level of tax administration rather, the relationship was changed from positive to negative (β -0.084; 
t=2.516; p>0.012) and its significant values have also been changed from stronger to the weaker 
position but within the significant level.  
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Figure 7. PLS-SEM Algorithm Moderator 
 
Figure 8. PLS-SEM Bootstrapping Moderator 
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Conclusion 
This study shows that only deterrence is not sufficient to increase taxpayers' compliance 
behavior in Pakistan, rather there is a need to improve the quality of public governance in the 
country (Alabede, Ariffin, & Idris, 2011). However, Pakistan is an Islamic country and in Islam, the 
concept of Zakat is very important. This study also shows that religiosity has a weak and negative 
impact on taxpayers' compliance behavior but it has a moderating impact on the tax administration 
system and quality of public governance. This study has validated the suggestions of Jackson & 
Millron (1986) that some other factors were present in the Fischer’s model of compliance behavior. 
This issue should also be considered by the Federal Board of Revenue to increase the tax base.  
Future researchers may consider financial conditions, risk preferences, and some other 
factors as moderator to test the taxpayers' compliance behavior. Above mentioned constructs can be 
considered as independent variables as well. Future research can be exploratory in nature or 
triangulation to confirm the results of the current study.  
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